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ABSTRACT 
This paper builds on work by Zegarac and Clark (Zegarac and Clark, forthcoming; 
Zegarac, in press) on phatic communication. Zegarac and Clark define phatic 
interpretations as interpretations which depend on the recognition of a communicative 
intention (as defined by Sperber and Wilson 1986 and exploited in their definition of 
ostensive communication). This definition does not link phatic interpretations directly to 
social functions but does reflect the fact that phatic interpretations have social effects. The 
social effects follow from the fact that any act of ostensive communication is, by definition, 
social. Zegarac discusses how phatic interpretations become standardised and 
conventionalised. Here we explore the processes of standardisation and 
conventionalisation in more detail. A first glance at the phenomena suggests an interesting 
paradox. When a particular linguistic form becomes so frequently linked with phatic 
interpretations that this usage becomes conventionalised, Zegarac and Clark's definition 
seems to predict that utterances containing that form will no longer give rise to phatic 
interpretations (because the interpretation will depend on the linguistically-encoded 
meaning rather than on the recognition of a communicative intention). We consider an 
alternative approach to that proposed by Zegarac, which exploits the relevance-theoretic 
notion of procedural encoding. We show how such an approach might lead to the 
modification of a prediction of Zegarac and Clark, i.e. the claim that purely phatic 
interpretations arise only when non-phatic interpretations are not consistent with the 
principie of relevance. 
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1. Phatic ínter pretations 
Zegarac and Clark (forthcoming) propose the following definitions: 
Phatic implication: 
A phatic implication is an assumption which depends on the communicative 
intention alone (perhaps interacting with contextual assumptions, some of which 
may exploit linguistically-encoded meanings).1 
Phatic implicature: 
A phatic implicature is an ostensively-communicated assumption which depends on 
the communicative intention alone (perhaps interacting with contextual 
assumptions, some of which may exploit linguistically-encoded meanings). 
Phatic interpretation: 
An interpretation is phatic to the extent that it contains phatic implicatures. 
Phatic utterance: 
A phatic utterance is one which gives rise to, or is intended to give rise to, phatic 
interpretations. 
Phatic communication: 
Phatic communication is communication which gives rise to, or is intended to give 
rise to, phatic interpretations. 
On this view, the termphatic is primarily used to describe inferential conclusions which 
are derived via a particular source, namely the recognition of a communicative intention. 
Any act of ostensive communication will, by definition, provide evidence for phatic 
implications. What determines whether particular utterances, or acts of ostensive 
communication, are phatic is the extent to which they provide evidence for phatic 
implicatures. This accounts for the intuitions that phaticness is a matter of degree (the more 
phatic implicatures an utterance gives rise to, the more phatic it is), that the utterance of any 
linguistic expression could give rise to phatic implicatures (depending on the accessible 
contextual assumptions), and that certain linguistic expressions are more likely to give rise 
to phatic implicatures than others. Zegarac and Clark go on to claim that a purely phatic 
interpretation will only be derived when non-phatic interpretations are not consistent with 
the principie of relevance; this is a claim to which we will return in the concluding section 
of this paper. A significant aspect of these definitions is that they do not make direct 
reference to social functions or social effects. Instead, the fect that phatic communication 
often has social effects follows from the fact that any act of ostensive communication is, by 
definition, social. On this account, everyday intuitions about the social functions of 
particular utterances are much less complex than the cognitive mechanisms which give rise 
to them. That is, people have intuitions about small talk and the social functions of certain 
utterances which are less formal and much vaguer than the technical account oí phatic 
communication proposed in Zegarac and Clark (forthcoming), which deals with the 
cognitive processes involved. 
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2. Standardisation and Conventionalisation 
Zegarac (forthcoming) suggests that phatic communication exists as a social institution 
(distinct from the cognitive processes described by Zegarac and Clark) and considers two 
ways in which phatic communication can become institutionalised: standardisation and 
conventionalisation. Zegarac discusses Bach's (1996) view that standardisation can be 
understood in terms of the notion of "short-circuited implicature" (for discussion see Searle 
1975; Morgan 1978; Bach and Harnish 1979). A "short-circuited implicature" arises when 
a particular linguistic form has been used frequently in such a way that it gives rise to a 
particular implicature, or type of implicature. Hearers may then access the intended 
implicature without going through all the usual processes of interpretation. Groefsema 
(1992) points out some serious problems with this notion, and Zegarac suggests an 
alternative, relevance-theoretic, account. He suggests that particular linguistic expressions 
can become associated not with implicatures but with contextual assumptions. Thus a string 
such as how are you ? may be used in phatic exchanges so often that contextual assumptions 
required to arrive at phatic interpretations become instantly accessible as encyclopaedic 
information about the expression. The difference between standardised and 
conventionalised phatic expressions is that the former retain linguistically encoded meanings 
which may contribute to the communication of non-phatic information, while the latter do 
not (this is also the sense in which we will use these terms). Zegarac concludes that 
standardisation processes nave no direct bearing on relevance theory but that they may play 
a role in the institutionalisation of phatic communication. He follows Sperber (1996) in 
suggesting that institutionalisation involves the spread of higher-order representations (very 
roughly) of the form ifyou meet a person ofequal or lower status who you know and who 
you haven 't seen earlier that doy, you may greet them by saying 'how are you ?' 
Zegarac claims that standardised expressions such as how are you ? make available 
encyclopaedic knowledge about how such expressions are usually understood, in the form 
of "assumptions about the typical contexts in which particular strings are usually processed 
for relevance." (We interpret 'contexts' here to mean what Malinowski (1923) termed 
'contexts of situation' rather than the more particularised 'contexts ofutterance'.)Healso 
states that conventionalised expressions, "like hi and helio, do not contribute to the 
interpretation of the utterances in which they appear in virtue of their linguistic meaning 
(either because it has become suppressed, or because they have none), but rather in virtue 
of people's encyclopaedic knowledge about their use." Zegarac illustrates this as follows: 
when Mary says helio to Peter, (1) he forms a description of the act of ostensión: Mary has 
saidUELLO to me, (2) he accesses some relevant contextual assumptions about how helio 
is usually understood: 'helio "is an informal greeting, and (3) he uses (1) and (2) as premises 
in deriving the conclusión: Mary has greeted me informally. Because helio is a 
conventionalised expression, the contextual assumptions used in stage (2) of the utterance 
interpretation process are immediately accessible to Peter. The only difference between 
conventionalised expressions and standardised expressions like how are you? on this 
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accoimt is that standardised expressions also encode some linguistic meaning in addition to 
making encyclopaedic knowledge about their use immediately accessible. 
If Zegarac's account is correct, these standardised and conventionalised expressions 
have less in common with most other verbal expressions than with non-verbal modes of 
expression such as gestores (like handshakes, kisses and salutes) and clothing (for example 
a dinner jacket or a ball gown makes immediately accessible to an observer encyclopaedic 
knowledge about the type of event at which such clothes are typically wora). In the case of 
conventionalised expressions, which according to Zegarac have no linguistic meaning, we 
are dealing with verbal gestores rather than with linguistic expressions. 
3. Types of Conventionalisation 
In this section we point out a possible alternative approach to Zegarac's account of 
conventionalisation, drawing primarily on data from grammaticalisation (the development 
of grammatical markers of, for example, tense, aspect and modality from lexical 
expressions such as main verbs). This approach draws on the relevance-theoretic notion of 
procedural encoding. 
Zegarac claims that a standardised expression such as how are you ? makes available 
encyclopaedic knowledge about the type of context in which it typically occurs. This is a 
context in which phatic interpretations are derived (where phatic interpretations, according 
to Zegarac and Clark (forthcoming) and Zegarac (in press), are interpretations containing 
implicatures which are inferred from the fact that the speaker has made mutually manifest 
the intention to communicate with the addressee). When an expression becomes 
conventionalised on this account, any linguistically encoded meaning becomes suppressed 
leaving just encyclopaedic knowledge about the type of context in which the 
conventionalised expression is typically used. A similar account has been given for the type 
of conventionalisation involved in the development of the grammatical marker will. When 
the lexical source expression of Modern English will, the Oíd English main verb willan 
meaning approximately 'to want', was used with first person subjects, it typically gave rise 
to implicatures to the effect that the situation or event represented by the rest of the utterance 
was one which the speaker intended to bring about. From this it could be further inferred 
that the situation or event in question was yet to occur. Over time will carne to indicate 
rature time reference with first person subjects, later generalised to all persons, and more 
recently to indicate that an associated event is potential in the sense of not yet verified (either 
because it is yet to occur or for some other reason) (see Nicolle 1997). Drawing a parallel 
with Zegarac's account of conventionalisation, we could argüe that will makes available 
assumptions about the contexts (in this case 'contexts of utterance') in which it typically 
occurs, namely that will is used in contexts in which it can be inferred that the situation or 
event referred to has yet to occur or be verified. The original lexical meaning of willan has 
been suppressed and no longer exists, and so Modern English will has no linguistically 
encoded meaning, it merely makes available encyclopaedic knowledge about its use. 
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However, recent relevance theoretic accounts of will have not assumed that grammatical 
markers (will, auxiliary have, etc.) are devoid of linguistic meaning. Instead, it has been 
suggested that such expressions encode procedural information of different sorts (see 
Blakemore 1987, 1988, Wilson & Sperber 1993, Nicolle forthcoming for discussion).2 
Haegeman (1989: 306) argües that will "signáis that the hearer should extend the 
immediately accessible (present) context for the processing of the proposition and should 
process the utterance against future propositions"; Klinge (1993: 323) also holds that will 
is procedural, but argües that it encodes 'potentiality' rather than futurity as the constraint 
imposed on processing, and Nicolle (1997) argües that will encodes procedural information 
to represent an associated situation or event as unverified. What all these procedural 
accounts of will have in common is the claim that will encodes a processing constraint on 
the way an associated utterance is to be interpreted; only the precise nature of this constraint 
differs.3 
A similar account could also be proposed for standardised and conventionaHsed phatic 
expressions. On this approach, it could be argued that how are you ? encodes procedural 
information which constrains the inferential processes by which appropriate phatic 
implicatures are derived. In the following section, we describe some of the possible forms 
such procedural information might take and discuss some possible modifications such an 
approach mightsuggestto predictions which, according to Zegarac and Clark, follow from 
their own account and the central claims of relevance theory. 
4. Implications of a Procedural Account 
Linguistic expressions which encode procedural meaning may constrain the utterance 
interpretation process in two main ways. They may directly constrain the inferential 
computations performed over conceptual representations, or they may "impose constraints 
on the contexts in which utterances containing them must be interpreted" (Blakemore 1987: 
75). Let us look at the standardisation and conventionalisation of phatic expressions from 
these two perspectives, starting with constraints imposed on contexts. Contexts are 
constructed on-line as part of the utterance interpretation process, and it has been claimed 
that some procedural encoding constrains the construction of utterance interpretation 
contexts (for example, Jucker 1993 argües that the discourse connective well encodes the 
procedural information that the currently most salient context is not the most relevant for 
the interpretation of the forthcoming utterance). 
What would a procedural account of the expression how are you ? look like? Clearly, 
the constraint on contextual assumptions cannot be too strong. If we suggested, for 
example, that how are you ? encoded procedural information to the effect that the most 
relevant context for the interpretation of the utterance in which it occurs is that of, say, a 
conversational opening among friends and acquaintances, we would falsely predict that an 
occurrence of how are you ? intended as a genuine enquiry, for example in a medical 
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interview, would be infelicitous. Clearly, it is not (see Coupland, Coupland and Robinson 
1992 for a discussion). 
An alternative account of the contení of any procedural information encoded by how are 
you ? might concern the derivation of phatic implicatures. On such an account, standardised 
and conventionalised expressions such as how are you? and ni could encode procedural 
information to the effect that an addressee should begin the processing of an associated 
utterance by deriving phatic implicatures (that is, assumptions which depend on the 
communicative intention alone). The criterion of consistency with the principie of relevance 
states that the utterance interpretation process should cease with the first interpretation 
tested and found to be consistent with the principie of relevance (giving rise to adequate 
contextual effects whilst incurring minimal processing effort). Given the procedural account 
of how are you ? and hi outlined above, we would predict that an addressee would first 
compute phatic implicatures and only go on to derive other, non-phatic, assumptions if a 
purely phatic interpretation was not consistent with the principie of relevance. In the case 
of standardised expressions such as how are you? which also encode conceptual 
information, this means that explicatures (propositions derived from inferentially enriching 
the conceptual linguistic content of an expression) would only be derived if a purely phatic 
interpretation of the utterance feiled to achieve consistency with the principie of relevance.4 
This can be illustrated by looking at the interpretation of how are you ? given two different 
sets of contextual assumptions (these invented examples are used for illustration; we will 
then relate the illustrations to some real data). 
(1) Contextual assumptions. Mary is a colleague of the Peter and has not seen 
Peter since the previous day. They have a good working relationship but 
are not cióse friends. Peter has been experiencing back pains recently, but 
he does not know whether Mary is aware of this. 
Mary: How are you? 
Peter: Fine. How are you? 
An account of example (1) on this approach might say that Mary's utterance of the 
standardised expression how are you? conveys procedural information which instructs Peter 
to derive phatic interpretations without first having to compute any non-phatic assumptions 
(implicatures or explicatures). Peter does not even consider that Mary may have found out 
abouthis back pains, since a purely phatic interpretation yields adequate contextual effects 
given the available contextual assumptions. 
(2) Contextual assumptions. Jane is a doctor to whom Peter has come for 
advice about his back pain. The setting is Jane's surgery. 
Jane: How are you? 
Peter: Well, I've been having problems with my back... 
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In this scenario, this approach might say that Peter judges that Jane's greeting does not yield 
adequate contextual effects if only phatic implicatures are derived. He therefore develops 
the conceptual information also encoded by how are you ? to arrive at an interpretation in 
which Jane's utterance is intended to be understood as an invitation to Peter to talk about his 
medical problems. 
The initial Well, ... of Peter's reply is interesting. We mentioned above that Jucker 
(1993) has argued that well indicates that the currently most salient context is not the most 
relevant for the interpretation of the forthcoming utterance. According to either Zegarac's 
account or the procedural account suggested above, the context created by an utterance of 
how are you? typically includes many phatic implicatures. By prefacing his reply with well, 
Peter indicates that such a context is not sufficient for the optimally relevant processing of 
his forthcoming utterance. Well is common in naturally occurring data also. Coupland, 
Coupland and Robinson (1992) recorded the responses of elderly people in a social club 
who were interviewed about their experiences of health care (the respondents knew the topic 
of the interview and were told that the interviewer was not a health specialist). Each 
interview began with the interviewer uttering how are you ? "said smiling and uniformly 
without any clear primary stress" (Coupland et al. 1992: 220). Nine of twenty seven 
reported responses which were not purely phatic were introduced by well (one respondent 
uttered eleven initial wells). This is what we would expect given that an utterance oí how 
are you? encourages the addressee to derive a large number of phatic implicatures, but also 
encodes additional information. If a purely phatic interpretation of how are you ? is not 
optimally relevant to an elderly respondent, but she or he suspects that the interviewer may 
have intended it to be interpreted purely phatically, this assumption may be conveyed by 
prefacing a response in which the respondent describes various medical conditions with the 
discourse connective well. A typical response which suggested a phatic interpretation was 
oh I'mfine thankyou; typical responses suggesting non-phatic interpretations were: Well 
(.) up anddown likeyouknow [whichcontained 11 initial welh]; WellI'm not bad; and Well 
not very well I'vejusthad a badfall (examples from Coupland et al. 1992: 221-224). 
This account suggests a possible modification to one of the central claims of Zegarac 
and Clark (forthcoming). Zegarac and Clark proposed that every utterance may give rise 
to phatic implicatures, since a phatic implicature is an ostensively-communicated 
assumption which depends on the communicative intention alone, and an utterance is, by 
definition, an act of ostensive communication. The intuition that phaticness is a matter of 
degree arises from the fáct that different utterances provide differing amounts of evidenee 
for phatic implicatures. Zegarac and Clark also claimed that a purely phatic interpretation 
will only be derived when non-phatic interpretations are not consistent with the principie 
ofrelevance, that is, when no non-phatic interpretation yields adequate contextual effects. 
What our discussion here suggests, however, is that in the case of standardised and 
conventionalised phatic expressions phatic implicatures are the first to be inferred, either 
because the appropriate contexts are made immediately accessible (as Zegarac claims) or 
because such expressions encode procedural information to the effect that an addressee 
should begin the utterance interpretation process by deriving phatic implicatures (as we have 
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tentatively suggested). In the case of standardised expressions, which also encode 
conceptual infonnation, we suggest a converse principie to the general claim proposed in 
Zegarac and Clark (forthcoming): when a standardised expression is processed, non-phatic 
interpretations should only arise when purely phatic interpretations are not consistent with 
the principie ofrelevance. 
5. Conclusión 
Our tentative discussion here contains some notable gaps. Perhaps the most significant of 
these is that we have presented no detailed arguments for or against procedural accounts of 
standardisation and conventionalisation. Furthermore, we have not explored in detail the 
potentially paradoxical notion that a linguistic expression could encode an instruction to 
develop a phatic interpretation of an utterance containing it. We hope, though, that we have 
shown that Zegarac and Clark's work raises interesting and non-trivial questions about 
linguistic semantics, pragmatics and relevance theory. 
Notes 
1. "Depends on" is to be understood in a technical sense here, where "depends on X" means 
"results from an inferential process which takes X as apremise." 
2. Procedural encoding contrasts with conceptual encoding, which as its ñame suggests is 
concerned with the linguistic encoding of concepts (see Sperber and Wilson (forthcoming) for 
a discussion of the relation between words and concepts). Procedural encoding, on the other 
hand, is concerned with the inferential computations performed over concepts. 
3. In the case of will, previously encoded conceptual information (the sense of 'desire' 
encoded by OE willari) has been lost, but in other expressions, such as be going to, Nicolle 
(forthcoming) argües that conceptual and procedural encoding are both encoded. 
4. It could be argued that this begs the question of how an addressee knows which of the two 
types of information encoded by a standardised expression (conceptual and procedural) to recover 
first. Nicolle (forthcoming) argües that since the purpose of procedural information is to reduce 
inferential processing effort, it should always be recovered first, and that additional conceptual 
information will only be recovered if an interpretation based purely on procedural information 
fails to achieve adequate contextual effects. Another account might suggest that inferences 
starting from the conceptual and the procedural meaning are performed simultaneously. 
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